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Residential electrical demand response (DR) offers the prospect of reducing the environmental impact
of electricity use, and also the supply costs. However, the relatively small loads and numerous actors
imply a large effort: response ratio. Residential DR may be an essential part of future smart grids, but
how viable is it in the short to medium term? This paper reviews some DR concepts, then evaluates the
propositions that households in cool temperate climates will be in a position to contribute to grid
ﬂexibility within the next decade, and that that they will allow some automated load control. Examples
of demand response from around the world are discussed in order to assess the main considerations for
cool climates. Different tariff types and forms of control are assessed in terms of what is being asked of
electricity users, with a focus on real-time pricing and direct load control in energy systems with
increasingly distributed resources. The literature points to the signiﬁcance of thermal loads, supply mix,
demand-side infrastructure, market regulation, and the framing of risks and opportunities associated
with DR. In concentrating on social aspects of residential demand response, the paper complements the
body of work on technical and economic potential.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. From ‘predict and provide’ to responsive demand
In this section, we deﬁne and discuss demand response (DR),
before setting it in the context of emerging smart grids and their
stakeholders, and offering two assumptions about the future of
residential DR for examination.
A major shift is under way from the ‘predict and provide’
model of electricity provision (McKenna et al., 2011). There are a
number of reasons for this, including growth in non-despatchable
and distributed modes of supply (Thomson and Inﬁeld, 2007), and
emerging patterns of demand with additional loads for heating,
ICT and electric vehicles. These changes in both supply and
demand bring with them a need for measures to avoid networkarby).
Y license.congestion and maintain acceptable power quality—if possible,
while avoiding costs of new generating capacity and network
reinforcement (Strbac, 2008). Further impetus for change comes
from the need to contain overall demand, in order to minimise
resource depletion, pollution, and greenhouse gases (e.g., DECC,
2009), and from concern about the ﬁnancial and environmental
costs of meeting peak demand (Ericson, 2009; Faruqui, Harris and
Hledik, 2010).
‘Demand response’ is increasingly seen as a way of meeting
emerging needs for better system management and concerns
about energy security and environmental impact. We begin with
a deﬁnition from the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
that demand response (DR) is
Changes in electric usage by demand-side resources from their
normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price
of electricity over time, or to incentive payments designed to
2 This concept is central to the SuperGen HiDEF research programme—see
http://www.supergen-hidef.org/about/Pages/Home.aspx. HiDEF investigates ‘a
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prices or when system reliability is jeopardized (FERC, 2012).
Demand response is here seen essentially as a response to a
price signal (although other signals may also be relevant, as
discussed below), which may involve time-shifting or load reduc-
tion, or both. This ﬁts with a more speciﬁc deﬁnition of household
DR as ‘a household action which shifts and/or reduces overall
energy use in response to a price signal or other price stimulus’
(Owen and Ward, 2010, p.15).
A crucial element in the move towards DR has been the
development of ICT that makes highly-responsive systems feasi-
ble. ‘Smart meters’, with their capacity to record and transmit
high resolution consumption data rapidly, are perhaps the most
widely-known ICT development in electricity systems, and are
seen as a key enabler of DR (Darby, 2008; McKenna, Richardson
and Thomson, 2012). A particular DR action can be automated,
manual, or both, as discussed in Section 2.
1.1. Smart grids and stakeholders
Having indicated why there is increasing focus on DR, we now
discuss the emerging context in which it operates, and the
principal stakeholders involved.
Demand response may be seen as a form of distributed energy
resource, along with distributed generation and storage1 . As such,
it is necessary for the effective working of smart grids, broadly
deﬁned as
y electricity networks that can intelligently integrate the behaviour
and actions of all users connected to [them] – generators, consumers
and those that do both – in order to efﬁciently deliver sustainable,
economic and secure electricity supplies. (SmartGrids European
Technology Platform, widely cited, e.g., http://www.esat.kuleu
ven.be/electa/research/descriptions/smartgridsetps.pdf )
We are still at a very early stage in understanding social and
governance aspects of smart grids during the evolution from
highly centralised systems with relatively few large generators
and relatively predictable demand patterns, to systems with
multiple generators, less predictable supply, and more diverse
and unpredictable demand. Wolsink (2012) offers a comprehen-
sive guide to the issues.
Policy-makers typically aim for systems that achieve security,
sustainability, economic and social goals (high-level drivers cited
by the EU Commission Task Force for Smart Grids, EC, 2010a). The
principal stakeholder groups in DR are transmission system
operators (TSO), distribution network operators (DNOs), genera-
tors, electricity retailers, users, and government. Although most
electricity users are still unfamiliar with the concept of smart
grids, they have a stake in reliable, affordable energy services with
reduced environmental impact. However, they are largely una-
ware of the reasons for, and potential beneﬁts from, demand
response. The EU Commission Task Force on Smart Grids recently
concluded that:
The acceptability of new services by the customers is a main
concern [and] all opportunities for evaluating customers’ interest
must be used, specially involving them in demonstration projects
yAs smart grids and their beneﬁts still represent broadly misunder-
stood concepts by mosty consumers, and as many initiatives related
to smart grids or smart metering have created concerns and ques-
tions towards the usefulness and relevance of such developments,
[we] would recommend encouraging Member States to address1 Many of the considerations that apply to ‘classic’ residential demand
response can also apply to residential generation and storage. Indeed, load-
shifting can be seen as a form of storage.communication and education y [familiarise citizens with] opera-
tional and economic aspects of energy systems [and with] the
meaning of smart gridsy (EC, 2010b, pp 36–37).
The aim of this paper is to contribute to understanding of
social aspects of the proposed operation of smart grids, by
assessing prospects for residential demand response in cool
temperate climates from the user’s standpoint. Two widely-held
assumptions are examined: that households in cool temperate
climates will be in a position to contribute to network ﬂexibility
within the next decade, and that they will accept some automated
load control. The paper complements work by authors such as
Faruqui, Harris and Hledik (op.cit.), and Torriti, Hassan and Leach
(2010), who offer more quantitative and economics-based ana-
lyses potential for DR in Europe. It also adds to the recent analysis
by Kim and Shcherbakova (2011), which identiﬁes a number of
structural, economic and informational reasons for failures in
demand response.
In Section 2 of the paper, we set out options for residential DR
and assess them in terms of likely system requirements, and what
these imply for users. This is done by outlining scenarios for
electricity systems in the shorter and longer term, taking a more
detailed look at options for residential load management, and
then translating these into user choices and actions. Section 3
goes on to review examples of DR experience from selected
regions and programmes; and in Section 4 we discuss the
transferability of this experience, and what it tells us about the
viability of the assumptions.2. Residential demand response
Demand response will take different forms over time, as
electricity systems evolve, and in this section we address several
factors that shape response. After setting out the broad policy
landscape into which DR is being introduced, there is a classiﬁca-
tion of residential DR options, derived from literature review,
Commentary follows on issues raised by automation and the need
for customer awareness, and on the value of timing in DR.The
section concludes with an analysis of DR from the user’s perspec-
tive in an attempt to explain why householders might wish to
participate in DR programmes.
Table 1 outlines short- and long-term scenarios for Great
Britain. The long-term scenario is in accord with the concept of
a low-carbon highly-distributed electricity future2 with active
user participation, and the short-term scenario assumes a con-
tinuation of current developments. The table highlights likely
changes in the nature of user engagement with the system, as
both demand and supply become less predictable.
In the short term, the implied policy goal is to encourage
customers to reduce peak demand. In the longer term, it is to
achieve ﬂexibility, with a large component of automated response
that can be activated rapidly. Implementing these goals for the
residential sector poses considerable challenges, starting with the
cost and effort involved in communicating with millions of small
users, then equipping them with enabling technologies such as
smart meters and appliances, customer display interfaces and
remote switching. For example, more than two thirds of Great
Britain’s electricity is consumed by fewer than 10% of users,sustainable electricity supply system that makes optimum use of decentralised
assets and in which energy consumers participate actively in appropriately struc-
tured decentralised marketsy a major change from the present arrangement,
where most consumers are passive users of externally supplied energy, and [one
that] would require new attitudes to energy and new ways of working’.
Table 1
Short- and potential long-term characteristics of electricity systems in Great Britain.
Short term (to 2020) Longer term (post 2020)
Electricity system Centralised Highly distributed resources, including control and response
Critical issue for system
reliability
Peak demand Variability of renewable supply
Role of demand response Shift load at regular times of day;
reduce load
Shift load from times of low renewable generation (e.g., wind); store energy
at times of high renewable generation; balance network to allow for electric
vehicle charging and heatpumps in addition to traditional loads
Consumer response Adoption of tariffs with cheap offpeak
electricity(usually combined with electric
storage heating; some voluntary manual
load-shifting
More automated load-shifting; adoption of more complex tariffs, either with ﬁxed
rates for ﬁxed periods of time or dynamic rates according to supply availability
Likely means of achieving
demand response
‘Consumer engagement’. load-shifting in
response to static time-of-use tariffs or
other signals. Some continuation of
storage heating.
‘Active demand’. Dynamic pricing. Some conscious/manual load-shifting, but
response is mostly automated. Some is programmed by householders, by
agreement with energy services providers. Some comes from appliances
responding automatically to pricing signals/ voltage ﬂuctuations.
Table 2
Description of residential demand response options.
Demand response option Description
Energy efﬁciency and
conservation programmes
Encourages the purchase of energy-efﬁcient
appliances or building improvements, thereby
reducing overall demand.
Static time-of-use pricing Electricity prices vary according to the period of
the day—prices are low when the demand is
low (at night) and high when the demand is
high (during the day). Prices do not vary on a
day-to-day basis.
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worthwhile before the potential of larger users has been exploited
(Owen et al., 2011). Aggregation of residential demand response
is very rare, and aggregators struggle to ﬁnd a business case for it
(Appel, 2011). As recent modelling of German household demand
and American plug-in electric vehicle charging has indicated,
investment in smart appliances or in enabling technology for
vehicle charging with real-time pricing (RTP) may not be justiﬁed
in purely economic terms (Gottwalt et al., 2011; Lyon et al., 2012).
However, system management reasons for extending demand-
side activity into the residential sector include the following:Critical day pricing Similar to static time-of-use pricing, but where
prices are considerably higher, throughout the whole day, on a ’critical’ day compared to a
non-critical day.
Critical peak pricing Similar to static time-of-use pricing, but where
the prices are considerably higher during the
peak period on a ’critical’ day compared to a
non-critical day.
Peak time rebates Similar to critical peak pricing, though where
customers receive a rebate if their consumption
is below a given threshold during the critical
peak period.
Real-time pricing Electricity prices vary throughout the day,
typically on an hourly basis. Prices are, inResidential demand often makes up a signiﬁcant share of
overall consumption—for example, 36% of the UK total in
2010 (DECC, 2011, Table 5.1.2). Electriﬁcation of personal
transport and heating is likely to continue, even if not to the
extent envisaged in plans such as the UK Low Carbon Transi-
tion Plan (DECC, 2009). This is likely to add to both peak
demand and to unpredictability. Moreover, solar PV, heat
pumps and electric vehicles are likely to be concentrated
geographically, leading to local network management difﬁcul-
ties (McKenna et al., 2012).theory, unpredictable, and follow some of the
volatility of wholesale electricity prices.
Demand-side bidding Consumers participate directly in the electricity
market by bidding for their expected demand
ahead of schedule. Typically, this would be an
automated process performed by consumer
appliances.
Dynamic demand Appliances respond automatically to system
frequency, by switching off when the frequency
drops below a certain threshold.Electricity use in the home already contributes disproportionately
to peak demand. In the UK, between 5–6pm, household demand
was reported as being responsible for 45% of system peak in 2005.
The relatively shiftable loads from water heating and wet
appliances accounted for 23% of this (Lampaditou and Leach,
2005). More recently, it has been estimated that only around 9%
of household electricity use is automatically switched or shifted
to offpeak times, much of it for (stored) space heating (Brattle
Group and Sustainability First, 2012). There may well therefore be
unrealised potential for more residential DR, through shifting
more electric space and water heating along with wet appliances
(ibid.). This potential has been widely noted in many countries,
(e.g., Stokke et al., 2010; Filippini, 2010; and Pavan, 2010 for
north, central and southern Europe respectively).
2.1. Residential demand response options
From the user perspective, the extent to which people shift
their consumption patterns will depend on factors such as
perception of the need to do so, trust in the utility or energy
service provider, incentives, and transaction costs (including
cognitive costs). This is demonstrated in the analysis of consumer
issues related to smart meter adoption by Roberts and Redgrove
(2011), and in the review of demand response and feedback trials
carried out by Stro¨mba¨ck et al. (2011).Load-management options are also complex, according to
purpose and mechanism (for example, Borenstein et al., 2002;
Goldman et al., 2010). In an attempt to reduce the complexity, we
concentrate here on those DR options that apply to the residential
sector, and on the actions required for each from household
occupants. The categories are derived from reﬂection on both
academic and ‘grey’ literature on demand response. These are
summarised in Table 2 and are described in more detail below.
Moving from the simplest demand response option, to the
most sophisticated, in terms of time-sensitivity, we have:(a) Energy efﬁciency and conservation programmes. These can be
aimed at entire buildings, or speciﬁc appliance groups. These
can reduce peak demand, as well as baseload, but do not
necessarily make systems more responsive.
S.J. Darby, E. McKenna / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 759–769762(b) Static time-of-use pricing (TOUP), when tariffs are stable for
long periods, and users have time to get used to them. As the
price bands reﬂect long-term average expectations of daily
peak marginal costs, they do not provide additional incentives
to reduce demand further on days when the system is most
stressed (Herter, 2007).
(Note that at this point on the spectrum, a category shift
occurs: we move from static pricing, for situations in which
supply is relatively predictable, to dynamic pricing, where it
both demand and supply may ﬂuctuate unpredictably. This
will be increasingly needed as distributed sources of supply
come on stream, and if demand becomes more peaky and
erratic with growth in electrical heating and transport.)(c) Critical day pricing (CDP) entails load curtailment over
periods of a day or more, with day-ahead warning. The EdF
‘Tempo’ tariff, used by over 100,000 small businesses and
roughly 350,000 high-consuming residential customers in
France, is probably the best-known example. It is reported
to cut national peak consumption by 4% (Torriti, Hassan and
Leach, 2010). The year is divided into ‘red’ (22), ‘white’ (45)
and ‘blue’ days. Unit prices for daytime on a red day are
roughly 12 times as high as for night time on a blue
day—dramatic and noticeable differentials. Variants of the
tariff involve direct load control (DLC) of water heaters and
space-heating thermostats. The main drawback for customers
is the difﬁculty in managing as many as ﬁve ‘red’ days in a
row, in cold, still weather (Crossley, 2008). This is relevant to
the long-term scenario for demand response with distributed
generation.(d) Critical peak pricing (CPP) over a few hours, with day-ahead
warning to the customer, is used for very sharp peaks in
demand. Feedback including ambient displays, which change
colour according to the current unit price of electricity, may
be used to alert customers to critical peak periods (Stro¨mba¨ck
et al., 2011).(e) Peak time rebates (PTR) are a variant on CPP, in which customers
are given a rebate for electricity that they do not use during
critical peak times. This is seen as more user-friendly than CPP,
because it involves no risk, but it is less effective than CPP at
reducing load (Faruqui and Sergici, 2010).(f) Real-time pricing (RTP) occurs when the customer pays prices
that are liable to vary more rapidly and less predictably
throughout the day than ‘static’ TOUP, posing more uncer-
tainty to the customer. Although prices may change as rapidly
as every ﬁve minutes, hourly pricing is a more realistic
scenario for RTP (e.g., Allcott, 2009).(g) Demand-side bidding involves contracting to offer speciﬁc
reductions in demand at given times, in return for speciﬁed
sums (Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008). This is a complex
arrangement for residential demand (tested in the Olympic
Peninsula project, discussed below) but could become more
feasible through aggregation.(h) ‘Dynamic demand’ (DD), at the far end of the spectrum is when
appliance load is shifted, sometimes only for a few seconds, in
response to changes in frequency (Short and Inﬂeld, 2007). This is
a way of supplying ancillary services to network operators. Some
‘smart’ appliances, enabled for DD, are already on the market.
Fridges show particular promise (Hirst, 2011).3 This estimate has since been supported by smart metering and TOUP trials
in Ireland (CER, 2011) and Great Britain (AECOM, 2011).2.2. Automation and awareness
When pricing is liable to change rapidly, or when response is
critical to network stability, some degree of automation is needed
for effective demand response. This could involve actions such as
installing a remote switching device to a water heater,programming several appliances to switch off when prices rise
above a certain level, or signing up to a static time-of-use tariff
such as Economy 7 (UK) or Tempo (France) that includes auto-
matic control of heating. Stro¨mback et al. (2011, pp 57–61) give
an overview of options and responses, ﬁnding that automation
boosts the level of peak clipping for all types of variable tariff
except for RTP, where the few trials to date have produced a lower
response than that from manual switching.
Automation, however, has at least three potential drawbacks:
the enabling technology can be expensive; it reduces user control;
and it can reduce users’ awareness of their energy-related
practices, possibly resulting in unintended consumption. Pro-
grammable thermostats offer a well-known example (see
Nevius and Pigg, 2000, and Guerra-Santin and Itard, 2010, for
analyses from the USA and Netherlands). There is therefore a need
to test out and evaluate automated solutions carefully before
mass deployment.
The recent review of demand response programmes by
Stro¨mba¨ck et al. ﬁnds that customer education (broadly deﬁned),
with its potential to raise awareness, has a signiﬁcant impact on
outcomes, as does improved feedback. The authors argue that
‘education should be included within dynamic pricing programs,
especially those involving automation, as it helps to decrease total
consumption rather than only peak consumption’ (p.67). They
found that 92 trials of TOUP without any accompanying customer
education gave an average 1% rise in overall consumption and a
4% fall in peak usage, whereas 122 trials that included some
education led to 4% overall and 6% peak reductions. In summary,
automation is not a substitute for awareness, and awareness
boosts the impact of automation.2.3. The value of timing
The value of different types of response to wholesale and ancillary
markets can be inferred to some extent from the terms of inter-
ruptible supply contracts, and from TOUP and dynamic pricing
schemes. But DR is something that has to be tested and then
negotiated, until the value of an action to an end-user intersects
with its value to the network, Where residential demand is con-
cerned, this negotiation may be particularly complex. For example, if
cooking can be delayed, this is particularly valuable over very short
periods of time to a network operator. However, experience suggests
that people are unlikely to alter their preferred cooking and eating
times, so that an incentive would have to be very signiﬁcant in order
to persuade them to shift usage. It might also have to be commu-
nicated at very short notice.
Wood and Newborough (2007) offer a detailed analysis of the
extent to which domestic appliances are suited to manual or
automatic control. This is useful in any consideration of how
demand response can best be arranged to meet different require-
ments, such as dynamic demand through ‘smart’ cold appliances,
or short-term load-shifting through manual delay of wet appli-
ance usage. Roscoe and Ault (2010) discuss the relative accept-
ability of shifting different end-uses, with modelling that
indicates that UK load could be reduced by over 10% during times
of high demand and low wind generation3 .
Water heating, space heating, air-conditioning and freezing
offer value in the medium term (from around 20 min to several
hours). They can be switched remotely or manually; impacts on
comfort and health will depend on the thermal characteristics of
the building, storage tank or freezer. Wet appliances also have
shifting potential in the medium term, although there is little
Table 3
demand response from the user’s perspective.
Demand response option Level of user involvement, and comments
Overall (grid) demand reduction Invest in home retroﬁtting and efﬁcient
replacement appliances; switch appliances
off; alter settings; change practices in
relation to clothing, curtains etc; invest in
microgeneration and renewable heat
technologies.
Static price response
Economy 7 or ‘bioraria’ -type Some may be obliged to adopt this type of
S.J. Darby, E. McKenna / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 759–769 763evidence as yet on the acceptability of shifting wet appliance
usage.4
Demand response for periods of several days in a cool climate,
typically caused by a winter anticyclone, has great value (as
illustrated by the price structure of the ‘Tempo’ tariff), but poses
the most challenges for shifting and storage: it has to be viable in
terms of day-to-day living. Overall demand reduction still offers
the simplest way of avoiding the need for widespread storage
over lengthy periods, but even in relatively low-demand systems,
diversity of supply and some storage will be required to cope with
lengthy periods of cold weather.pricing (two price bands only) tariff because they have night storage
heaters, in which case heating is switched
on and off automatically. Some may choose
it after calculating that they have enough
shiftable load to justify washing, etc., in
offpeak hours. Then they have to remember
to do so, or manually or through
automation.
(Static) TOUP (may have more
than two price bands)
Active customer involvement can vary
considerably. Potential for automating
some end-uses, eg water heating, wet
appliances, even some space heating, to
optimise use of cheap electricity. User can
cede control to supplier/network operator;
manual override makes this more
acceptable (Caird and Roy, 2007).
Load response
CDP Choose tariff, watch for day-ahead
notiﬁcation of high demand, reduce
demand as far as compatible with comfort.
CPP Choose tariff, watch for notiﬁcation, reduce
demand at critical peak times.
PTR Choose tariff, watch for notiﬁcation, reduce
demand. More suitable than CPP for people
on low incomes.
Dynamic price response
RTP Requires good understanding; customers
may be able to set maximum prices they
are willing to pay, and/or may install
backup capacity or storage. Possible to
reduce risk through forward contracts, in
some regulatory situations. RTP is likely to
involve high degree of automation of
response, to keep pace with price changes.
Demand aggregation Offers advantages of RTP, with low
threshold for customer involvement.
Aggregators take ﬁnancial risk (low at
present, though likely to become more
signiﬁcant) and pass on some proﬁt to the
customer.
Frequency response
Dynamic demand Customer needs to invest in DD-enabled
appliances, i.e., those that switch on and off
in response to frequency on the network.
(Based on Darby, 2011).2.4. Demand response from the user standpoint: Why participate?
Likely participation rates are a critical consideration in making a
business case for demand response. Where customers have to opt
into a programme, these rates have typically been very low: a takeup
rate for TOUP of around 1% among residential customers was given
as typical for investor-owned utilities in the USA by Lutzenhiser et al.
(2009), and it was suggested that such low involvement could be due
to loss aversion as well as inertia (Letzler, 2006), indicating scope for
better programme design. Higher participation rates in demand
response are now being recorded, where utility-customer relations
are good (Stro¨mba¨ck et al., 2011). In Britain, a TOUP trial carried out
under the Low Carbon Network Fund recently reported take-up of
TOUP by 8% of customers following a direct marketing exercise5 .
Factors such as logical sequencing of messages, simplicity and a
sense of purpose can assist takeup—price is not the only considera-
tion (Strengers, 2010; McKenna et al., 2011). Non-economic or one-
off incentives (such as the chance to take part in smoothing network
operation, or the offer of a free programmable thermostat) have been
associated with successful recruitment by some American utilities
(SGCC, 2011).
Some household activities are highly time-sensitive, as noted
above; householders may not be aware of the rationale for demand
response and potential beneﬁts; and there may not be the conditions
to make it worthwhile. For example, some householders have very
low loads; their homes may not be well-insulated enough to time-
shift heating without discomfort; or they may not have storage
capacity or micro-generation. In addition, mistrust of utilities can
stand in the way of participation in an uncertain initiative. Table 3
examines what various DR options might look like from the house-
holder’s perspective, based on descriptions of these options in the
literature. It shows the potential value of manual override facilities
and demand aggregation in maintaining users’ sense of control and
reducing ﬁnancial risk.
Levels of automation will depend on user inclinations, end-
uses and system requirements. For example, someone with solar
PV might already experience a variable price signal—if there is a
price differential between export and import rates. When export
rates are low compared to import rates, as in the UK, they may
wish to minimise bills by checking weather forecasts and doing
their washing on sunny days; or to invest in technology that
switches loads on and off according to their PV generation.
Conversely, electric vehicle owners are unlikely to wish to change
from a situation where they can charge their cars at any time, on a
‘ﬂat’ tariff; regulators and network managers may have to impose
automated controls on charging in future, in order to maintain
security of supply.4 For example, night-time noise may be a problem, especially in small
dwellings.
5 See slide 55 from presentations at the National Stakeholder Forum of the
Customer-Led Network Revolution Project, May 9th 2012, at /http://www.
networkrevolution.co.uk/industryzone/projectlibraryS.This section of the paper has shown some of the complexities
of designing effective demand response, and also some of the
potential. It has highlighted the wide range of options, the
signiﬁcance of thermal loads, the value of timing and of risk
reduction, and the importance of combining selective automation
with user feedback and education, The following section reviews
some demand response initiatives in particular markets, with a
view to selecting lessons that are applicable to cool temperate
climates.3. Demand response experiences from selected regions
The effectiveness of tariff options ’depends critically on the
nature of the system where they are implemented’ (Batlle and
Rodilla, 2009, p15). Relevant factors include climate, built
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requirements, attitudes to data privacy, and everyday practices.
Tables 4 and 5 summarise ﬁndings from some residential
demand response trials, with brief comments on qualitative
aspects. They are far from exhaustive, but give an indication of
technologies and tariffs that have been tested. They also demon-
strate the range of outcomes, given the variety of technologies
and practices employed, and the variety of regulatory frame-
works, pricing structures, and living conditions. Even from areas
with a high penetration of air-conditioning, there are sharply
contrasting ﬁndings. For example, the Country Energy pilot
achieved 30% demand reduction at critical peak times through a
combination of advanced metering with in-home displays, TOUP
and CPP; while the Chicago RTP pilot, with hourly RTP and day-
ahead warnings of critical peak periods, produced no more than
half that ﬁgure.
Below, we comment in more detail on examples of the two
modes of pricing likely to be of most concern in cool temperate
climates over the coming decade (static TOUP and RTP), and on
potential enabling technologies. These two are the most relevant
of those listed above in Section 2, because TOUP represents likely
mainstream attempts to manage load through tarifﬁng up to 2020
or thereabouts, while RTP is the more relevant tariff type for low-
carbon future systems, as indicated in Table 1.
3.1. Static TOUP in Italy, Ontario, Finland and Ireland
In Italy, policy has focused mostly on efﬁciency, supported by
tariffs related to peak loads (i.e., capacity) for many residential
customers (Pavan, 2010; Owen and Ward, 2010). Almost all
householders now have an interval (smart) meter, without an
in-home display. A range of time-varying rates has been devel-
oped, with mandatory TOUP from July 2010 for the majority of
customers who buy from the main supplier, ENEL. In advance of
fully cost-reﬂective pricing, the regulator is running a major study
in order to understand what impact this TOUP has on household
consumption. (It is not necessarily popular: ENEL’s competitors
advertise ﬂat rates as an inducement to switch supplier.) In the
early days, it was reported in that Italian customers were only
beneﬁting from the new tariffs if more than 70% of their usage
occurred at off-peak times (Frontier Economics, 2010).
Residential customers in Ontario (like Italy, an early adopter of
smart meters) have been through the process of converting from a
two-stage rising block tariff (RBT) to a mandatory time-of-use
regime. The government has attempted to incentivise both con-
servation and load-shifting. The average household now pays a
very small amount more for electricity each year than under the
old tariff—some 0.2%. A low peak to off-peak price ratio – slightly
more than 2:1 – contributed to a muted reaction. High consumers
usually gain by moving from the previous rising block tariff to
TOUP, but not if they have particularly high consumption at peak
times (Rowlands and Furst, 2011).
In Finland, sharp peaks in demand can occur at any time of day
in extremely cold weather, so that static TOUP is not adequate for
regulating demand (Koponen (2010, pers. comm.). A form of DLC
is being developed to switch storage heaters off when necessary,
and to spread out ‘rebound’ demand when they are switched back
on after peak times. This uses an algorithm based on heat demand
(related to outdoor temperature in previous 24 h) and time (the
cheapest available hours signalled by the day-ahead market)
(Koponen and Seppa¨la¨, 2011). Challenges include multiple heat-
ing systems and higher system peaks following introduction of
heat pumps. Insulation can improve the situation, lowering the
heating load and making DLC more acceptable by reducing any
loss of comfort when the heating is switched off. Koponen (pers.
comm.) reports ﬁeld tests of DLC in the winter of 1996–1997 with
Table 5
Summary of ﬁndings from selected European demand response trials.
Studyþdate Country Sample size and
selection
Length of trial Electric heating Tariff type Direct load control Overall
demand
reduction
Peak reduction and comments
Comments
Renner et al. (2011)n Czech
republic
Large Since 1970s Storage heating
and/or WH
Double tariff using
two (dumb)
meters
Ripple control 10–15% of max grid load.
Renner et al. (2011)n Denmark 500þ , probably
opt-in
24 months All had electric SH New contracts
with spot prices
included.
46 had DLC No savings from price info alone;
approx 10% for those with DLC.
Customers could specify prices at
which with DLC of heating would
take over.
Crossley (2008) France 350,000þ Since early 1990s High penetration
of electric SH and
WH
CPP 22 day/year;
medium prices 43
day. P:OP ratio
approx 12:1
Some DLC of
boiler, water
heater and
thermostats.
Approx 45%
on CPP days,
Average 1 kW reduction per
customer Up to ﬁve CPP days in a
row can be difﬁcult for
householders to manage.
CER (2011) Ireland 5,028 12 months Some electric
space and water
heating
TOUP. P:OP ratios
from 1.7:1 to
4.2:1were tested
2.5% 8,8%. In-home displays designed
with customer assistance raised
savings to average 3.2% overall,
11.3% peak.
Stokke et al. (2010) Norway 443 3 months
(Dec–Feb)
High penetration
of electric SH
‘Demand Charge
grid tariff’ for
highest hourly
usage at peak
Not
stated—probably
not
Average 5%. Consumers did not
receive information on
consumption or any reminders.
Saele and Grande
(2011)
Norway 40 12 months All had 2–3 kW
WH; 10% had
12–15 kW SH
Hourly spot price
combined with
ﬁxed price up to a
given volume
Of SH and WH,
with override
available
1 kW for water heating; 2.5 kW for
space heating. Some and automated
load reduction at peak times, plus
reduction. Scaling result up gives
potential 4.2% registered peak
demand from 50% of Norwegian
households.
Pyrko (2006); also
Renner et al.
(2011)n
Sweden 24,000 24 months Likely high
penetration of
electric SH
Grid fees
depending on
average peak
demand.
No Approx 5%. Important that
customers’ understand difference
between ‘‘power/load’’ and
‘‘energy’’ terms, and have good
feedback.
Sernhed (2008) Sweden 10 Brief Electric SH and
WH
No special tariff DLC for up to16 h,
or 4 h, 3 times
daily
Comfort and convenience
negotiable against incentives. All
households pay capacity-related
tariff and have to adjust behaviour
in very cold weather, to avoid fuse
blowing.
Renner et al. (2011)n Sweden 45 ﬁrst winter,
93 s winter
Two winters CPP, for a
maximum of 40 h
Not stated Approx. 50%. Customers given
energy-saving tips, and day-ahead
warnings of CP periods. Willingness
to support local utility.
Renner et al. (2011)n Sweden 50 All had electric SH Yes 5 users showed reduction of 67% in
heating load over 2-h period in very
cold weather. No complaints about
discomfort due to DLC.
Ofgem/AECOM
(2011)
UK (GB) Two trials in EDRP 24 months Some electric SH
and WH
No Up to 10%.
Abbreviations: CPP—critical peak pricing, DLC—direct (remote) load control, SH—space heating, TOUP—static time-of-use pricing, WH—water heating.
n This report gives brief summaries of a number of residential demand response trials and projects (pp 115–148); it is not an exhaustive account.
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with fewer than one in a thousand customers complaining. Most
did not notice that the DLC was occurring.
The trials of smart metering and static TOUP (with three or
four price bands) carried out by the Commission for Energy
Regulation in Ireland are among the most statistically robust to
date (CER, 2011). They show average savings of 2.5% overall and
8.8% at peak times, compared with the control group, when a
combination of TOUP and some form of customer feedback or
incentive was offered; peak demand reduction rose to 11.3%
when TOUP was combined with in-home displays and bimonthly
informative billing. Households with higher consumption tended
to achieve greater reductions, having more scope, but fuel-poor
households also beneﬁted from the new tariffs. Interestingly,
there seemed to be no ‘tipping point’ or ‘tipping price’ beyond
which electricity was seen as too expensive: peak demand was
highly inelastic, regardless of the size of the peak:off-peak ratio
(this ranged from 1.7:1 to 4.2:1). It appeared as though the main
factor affecting customer response was the existence of time-
varying prices, rather than the actual ﬁgures involved. The
beneﬁts at this early stage of introducing new tariffs were of a
fairly general nature, with raised awareness among almost all
customers and a response to the overall intention of the new
tariffs, not the detail. The CER noted that safety and convenience
considerations both affected the extent to which customers were
willing to shift usage to night times, but that, in general, customer
response to the trial was positive, with only 18% of participants
reporting no impact.3.2. Real-time pricing in Illinois, Washington State and elsewhere
The Illinois Energy-Smart Pricing Plan (ESPP) was ‘the ﬁrst
signiﬁcant effort to introduce hourly market-based electricity
pricing to residential customers’ with the aim of allowing them
to capture some beneﬁts of cost-reﬂective pricing (Summit Blue,
2006). It began 2003, with 750 members of the Chicago Energy
Cooperative (CEC), mostly on low incomes, and grew to 1500
participants with a broader spread of incomes, ending in 2006.
The ESPP was used as the basis for rollout of two large residential
RTP plans by investor-owned utilities (Star et al., 2010). It
involved day-ahead price notiﬁcation by phone or website, with
special arrangements for critical peak days when the price was
going to be over 10cents/kW h, so that participants could adjust
consumption manually. Prices never rose above 36c/kW h (there
was a cap of 50c/kW h). The CEC provided customer education
and individual usage feedback to help participants.
The participants responded to these relatively modest changes
in hourly prices, even in extremely hot weather. There was an
estimated conservation effect of 3–4% during the summer, though
no signiﬁcant difference in usage during winter between partici-
pants and the control group. Price elasticity was 4.7% overall for
2005, but roughly twice as great during late summer afternoons
as earlier in the day; it was also greater on critical peak days than
on normal days.
Response was boosted by around 50% when customers had a
visual prompt (an orb that glowed in different colours according
to price); it also increased when customers had automated
cycling for their air-conditioners at peak times. When high-price
days were clumped together, though, response tended to fall
off—a similar effect to that noted when several ‘red’ days occur
together on the Tempo tariff in France. Perhaps surprisingly,
lower-income households were more responsive to price signals
than those on higher incomes, although such households nor-
mally have lower overall consumption and less load that can be
shifted. (This is in contrast to the CER ﬁndings reported above).In qualitative terms, the ESPP appeared to have combined an
initial, appealing incentive with a durable impact:
Three years of impact evaluations have demonstrated consistent
reduction in peak load and a conservation effect. Education is a
key factor in inﬂuencing this change, and the potential for
lowering household electricity bills provides the incentive for
changes in behaviour.
(Isaacson et al., 2006, p 7–127)
Later commentaries tend to take a more critical stance. Allcott,
for example, concedes that advances in smart grid technology and
greater variability in hourly prices could have led to more
satisfactory results, but draws the policy message that
even in this selected group of households, RTP does not generate
energy-related compensating variation that is large in an absolute
sense, or in comparison to metering costs or the potential costs
incurred by households in conserving energyy these results do
not make a strong case for optional or population-wide residential
RT pricing (Allcott, 2009, pp16, 18).
Another more recent analysis concludes that a good efﬁciency
programme would be more productive than dynamic pricing with
high peak prices, and that
’the notion that residential customers should be moved en masse
to dynamic pricing is fraught with adverse consequences and,
more importantly, is likely to contribute to a customer revolt
against the ’Smart Grid’ agenda.’
(Alexander, 2010, p40).
Some of the original evaluators reached the measured conclu-
sion, after several years, that
Dynamic pricing remains a new idea for residential customersy
the test of consumer acceptance of dynamic pricing remains very
limited. It’s going to take more than just a bill insert or one direct
mail piece to get customers to change their electric rate voluntar-
ilyy getting customers to voluntarily embrace dynamic pricin-
gywill take an ongoing, long term series of engagements,
reminders, pokes and prods.
(Star et al., 2010, p. 2–267)
Another early documented attempt to introduce RTP was the
Olympic Peninsula project in Washington State. This was more
sophisticated than the ESPP, and one of the very earliest ‘smart
grid’ projects. It tested demand-side bidding, more than one time-
vaying tariff, smart meters, programmable communicating ther-
mostats, and water heaters and dryers that were automated to
respond to price signals. Supply was artiﬁcially constrained. A
combination of demand reduction and distributed generation
reduced peak loads by up to 50%, reduced cost to the consumer
by 10%, and had a conservation impact estimated at 6% for
customer on TOUP, though no such impact for those with RTP
(PNNL, 2007).
A recent review carried out for the European Smart Metering
Industry Group analyses data from 15 RTP pilots and programmes
worldwide (including the two mentioned above), and ﬁnds 12%
peak reduction and 13% ﬁnancial savings to the customer on
average (Stro¨mba¨ck et al., 2011). This sample includes short-term
pricing signals, and also a widely-adopted form of RTP in Norway,
where over half of residential customers are reported to be on
tariffs based on average monthly spot prices, which relate to the
amount of water in hydropower reservoirs and the expected
rainfall. As noted in Table 4, potential residential demand
response has been estimated at 4.2% of registered peak load. This
assumes 50% participation, as about half of all Norwegian house-
holds with electric water heating are estimated to be willing to
S.J. Darby, E. McKenna / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 759–769 767accept DLC for this end-use (Saele and Grande, 2011; Saele, pers.
comm.). In Sweden, too, a high and growing proportion of
householders have time-variable contracts, with and without
DLC—30% in 2009 (Stro¨mba¨ck et al., op.cit.).
These examples illustrate the rapid growth in dynamic pricing,
and some of the outcomes and issues in different parts of the
world. How generalizable are these experiences? In particular,
what are the social implications for demand response in cool
temperate climates, without sharp summertime peaks (com-
monly associated with critical peak pricing and ‘emergency’
response mechanisms) and with growing reliance on distributed,
variable generation? The following section considers these
questions.6 http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=7711.
7 The current smart grid programme on the island of Bornholm is exploring
this and related issues. See http://m.fco.gov.uk/travel;letter¼A/http%3Aukin-
spain.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/science-innovation/smart-grids-dec2011/Maja-
Bendtsen.4. Discussion: Transferability of DR experience
Having seen something of what ‘active demand’ involves from
the user’s standpoint, and reviewed what is known about user
response from a range of residential DR programmes, we now ask
whether it is safe to assume that households in cool temperate
climates will contribute to network ﬂexibility within the next
decade, and whether they will accept some automated load
control.
4.1. Willingness to contribute to network ﬂexibility
Residential electricity users rarely ask for time-varying pricing
if they are used to ﬂat rates, may not understand the rationale for
load-shifting, and may be wary about potential beneﬁts (see
above; also contrasting reports on TOUP in Great Britain and
Ireland, from Opinion Leader (2009), and CER (2011). However,
the experience reviewed above suggests that this can be
addressed by well-designed customer education programmes,
attention to data privacy concerns, and carefully-structured
tariffs. Static time-of-use tariffs could therefore be a staging post
on the road to RTP. Also, as supply and storage become more
distributed, network and grid management will take on a more
obviously local character and this could aid public understanding.
Real time pricing, with its additional complexity and risk to
the customer, is inherently more challenging than TOUP, but
there is evidence that this too can be made acceptable. The ESPP
experiment, for example, demonstrated that people respond
mainly to average prices and to high price alerts, rather than to
marginal prices, but also that tariffs that go beyond critical peak
pricing in complexity are still viable, when well-supported by
education and feedback.
The ESPP experience is not directly relevant to systems with a
signiﬁcant proportion of wind generation, where prices could
ﬂuctuate far more than was the case in Illinois. Sharp peaks in
summer demand are also a different proposition from the
broader-shouldered winter peaks of cooler and more temperate
climates, especially where electricity is a minority heating fuel.
However, the evidence from RTP to date shows how different
combinations of tariffs, education, feedback and automation are
being adopted and accepted in a range of locations and are
demonstrating some ﬂexibility.
4.2. Willingness to accept automation
The review above indicates that there is scope for automation
of some end-uses. Provided the public accept the necessity of new
measures to manage a system, trust the messenger, and are
offered some incentive to change, perceptions and practices can
alter. The Scandinavian experience of DLC shows that it can be
organised in such a way as to be almost unnoticeable, at any ratefor water heating. In the UK and Czech Republic, electric storage
heating is well-established and familiar, if not always popular.
From the network perspective, it makes sense to concentrate
on heating or cooling and vehicle charging, which are large loads
and need not be as time-sensitive as most other loads. House-
holds can then choose to operate other, more discretionary, loads
manually, in relation to prevailing prices or other signals. Already,
there are examples of tariffs and DLC arrangements being set in
such a way as to reﬂect the value of load management capability
to the network, and also the value of manual overrides to the
customer, while enabling technologies become part of package
agreements between the two.
Demand response can involve both reducing demand and
shifting it through time. The relationship between these is not
straightforward and has been discussed by a number of authors
(e.g., York and Kushler, 2005; Boshell and Veloza, 2008;
Alexander, 2010). The last of these makes the point that high
levels of consumption increase shifting opportunities for the
electricity supply industry, which can actually disincentivise
investment in efﬁciency measures. However, energy efﬁciency
can considerably increase the time scales over which DR can
happen, which is particularly valuable in power systems that rely
heavily on wind generation in winter. It does this, effectively, by
reducing discomfort or inconvenience and increasing the social
acceptability of either manual or automated load-shifting.
Load-shifting and demand reduction can reinforce each other.
For example, lower overall demand is likely to involve some
reduction at peak, while shifting peak demand reduces distribu-
tion losses and hence overall demand (Shaw et al., 2009); energy-
efﬁcient housing not only reduces overall demand for heating but
makes it possible to shift load from heat pumps over longer
periods of time (Hong et al., 2011). This has been observed even
when the average unit cost of electricity to the consumer is
reduced and a rebound effect might be expected (Allcott, 2009).
Some researchers have made a case for bringing together
efﬁciency and demand response as a ‘package’ for users (York
and Kushler, 2005; Goldman et al., 2010). The LEED programme in
the US is piloting a demand response option for certiﬁcation of
energy-efﬁcient buildings6 . This combination of efﬁciency and DR
is highly relevant to European policy goals.
There is an equity dimension to DR, given that any type of
tariff or direct control will affect people differently according to
their ability and willingness to change daily routines, adopt new
technology, invest in efﬁciency measures or participate more
actively in energy markets (Darby, in press). More advanced
forms of DR may involve making judgements about the appro-
priate scale of operating a given tariff, which inevitably affects
equity. Prices could differ to reﬂect local congestion, with one
street that hosts several electric vehicles or heat pumps paying
higher rates than one without either.7 Such a shift in the
allocation of electricity costs is highly signiﬁcant in political and
social terms.5. Conclusions
In most versions of a distributed energy future, customers will
effectively be enlisted as co-managers of the system, even if they
are not conscious of it. This marks a major shift in the nature of
electricity systems and their governance, and the social and
S.J. Darby, E. McKenna / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 759–769768equity aspects of demand response will require as much con-
sideration as is afforded to the technical and economic aspects.
Residential load forms a substantial and growing proportion of
demand in many countries, especially at peak, and it is now being
taken more seriously as an energy resource although it is so
highly distributed and involves so many actors. The propositions
that households in cool temperate climates will be in a position to
contribute to grid ﬂexibility within the next decade, and that that
they will allow some automated load control, seem to be valid,
broadly speaking.
However, reported participation levels from trials around the
world demonstrate that residential demand response has to be
worked for, even when some form of variable pricing has become
the default option. Some useful general principles can be identi-
ﬁed: for example, the importance of simple, clear tariffs, customer
education and attention to data privacy and security; good feed-
back systems for users and (through trials and system monitor-
ing) for suppliers.
There may seem to be a marked functional contrast between
‘active occupancy’ models of demand response with the energy-
aware user at the centre, and more passive load-response systems
in which many processes are automated. However, there are
gradations between conscious and automated response, such as
manual overrides to DLC allow for user ﬂexibility when energy
services are urgently needed. Careful selection and testing of
enabling technologies is needed.
From the user’s standpoint, there is a signiﬁcant difference
between static and dynamic tariffs. While static TOUP for resi-
dential customers appears less suited to systems with distributed
energy resources than RTP, it may still have a part to play in cool
temperate regions, shifting some load on a regular basis and
preparing the way for RTP by accustoming users to the time-
dependent value of electricity.
Managing several days at a time of cold, still weather is a
challenge, pointing to the need to continue minimising loads
through efﬁciency and conservation programmes: combining
demand response with demand reduction.
Finally, it is worth noting that research is now turning towards
the speciﬁcs of place, time, hardware, rules and practices in DR,
and a ﬂood of data is on its way. This is welcome, given the
complexity of analysing and planning smart grid development.
One of the main challenges for researchers and policymakers is to
identify and integrate the social aspects and governance implica-
tions of smart grids with the body of knowledge on technical
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